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INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS BY PERIPHERAL 
ECONOMIES: Notes Toward An Applied Analytical Frame
by Reginald Herbold Green
An Information System Approach To An Internally Rational 
International Business Economic Negotiations Strategy
A. Not a description, very often ad hoc not overall approach
and even these internally inconsistent as well as non­
coordinated;
B. Internally rational assuming some dominant group or
reasonably stably balanced coalition of decision takers. 
Content of strategy will relate to nature of that group 
or coalition;
C. Categorisation quasi journalistic:
Why Negotiate?
A. To achieve progress toward national (i.e. decision taking 
group or coalition) strategic ends. Includes socio political, 
socio economic, political economic system goals. A state 
seeking self reliant, participatory socialism and collective 
self reliance among peripheral economies will h£t'/e different 
goals than one seeking a capitalist domestic system integrated 
into the international economic system ruled by an elite
coalition through clientilist structures and seeking regionai 
dominance (of other peripheral economies). These differences 
•should inform the content, nature, pattern of negotiations.
B. More specifically the national strategy toward (and
1. Why Negotiate?
2. What Negotiate For?
3. Who To Negotiate With?
4. When To Negotiate?
5. Where To Negotiate?
6. How To Negotiate?
(Strategic Ends)
(Means to Implement Strategy) 
(Who Can Provide the Means) 
(Sequences, Priorities)
(What Topics, Sectors Are 
What, When Priorities) 
(Enhancing and Deploying 
Rights, Power, Capacity)
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perception of the nature of) the international economic 
system should affect negotiations. Variants include:
1. Relatively unselective integration into international
system (perceive as benevolent or easily alterable 
and/or unable to see any other option):
a. with one country e.g. Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cuba
b. with world economy e.g. Singapore, Taiwan,
Australia
c. lo trade variant of "b" e.g. India, Afghanistan. '
2. Specific attempt to achieve regional or global
centre role in world economy (perceive inequality) 
or exploitation and seek to get ahead in that 
context)
a. regional e.g. Kenya, Brazil
b. semi-regional e.g. Algeria (pre 1974), Egypt
c. global.e.g. Iran
3. Self reliant (i.e. high degree selectivity, closing 
of economy as systematic goal) approach
a. high trade variant e.g. Algeria (post 1974), Tanzania
b. low trade variant e.g. Somalia
c. versus particular centre e.g. Zambia (vs Rhodesia)
4. Collective self reliant via co-operative, integrative 
thrust among groups of peripheral economies e.g.
Andean Pact, East African Community, OPEC, Non-Aligned
5. Neo-Autarchic (extreme self reliant)
a. large e.g. China
b. small e.g. Burma, Cambodia
C. There are logical links between broader and international 
economic system strategy but not 1:1 correlations. Other 
considerations - both specific ideological and specific 
objective material conditions - are relevant.
D. Similarly key class strategies may be apparently similar 
but have different meaning in overall strategic contexts.
E.g. discouragement citizen capitalist class common to 
Senegal, Tanzania, China. But in Senegal articulated MNC- 
Levantine-Foreign African capitalists (common interests 
civil service and rural elites), with domestic public 
productive sector small and supporting private; in China
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almost all domestic public; in Tanzania large domestic 
public plus joint ventures with foreign (where case 
perceived as beyond present domestic public capacity) 
plus declining private.
E. Negotiations needed in any strategy. Even Cambodia 
negotiates trade agreement with Thailand and Thai based 
firms.
F. Negotiations not per se about traditional foreign invest­
ment e.g. Algeria virtually no foreign investment but 
turnkey plants, marketing and financing contracts (e.g. 
natural gas liquifaction and export); Eurodollar loans, 
technology purchases (e.g. machinery, organisation of 
public corporations) or e.g. EAC patterns and balance 
economic cooperation with potential members, associates 
(or indeed amond present members).
G. Negotiations may not be in format of round table talks.
E.g. immigration laws and work permits; training laws and 
government training programmes; fiscal penalties on hiring 
expatriates are in fact "negotiating" devices to secure 
citizenisation of staff. Unlikely to negotiate formally on 
their nature except in specific contracts (e.g. exemption
or waiver) but unless reckless must evaluate probable future 
and actual past effect and listen to, consider what firms 
say before decide to inaugurate or change them and when 
looking at impact of existing (especially newly added, 
altered) measures.
Ill What to bargain for - identifying means for reaching goals in
relation to proposed negotiations
A. Different economic and socio-economic means are needed to 
implement broader strategies e.g. foreign exchange, market 
access, supply access, access to finance, investible 
surplus generation, production to use specific resources, 
production in general (i.e. growth), particular types of 
employment (e.g. schoolleavers) , employment in general, 
soft technology (communications, marketing, training, 
purchasing, general management), hard technology (machines 
and processes), government revenue ;
Broader sub-aspects of strategy also relate to transactions 
e.g. control, national economic integration (forward, 
backward, sideways linkages), regional integration patterns
Each means must be related to the strategic frame e.g. 
the attitudes (perceptions) of foreign ownership, profits, 
profit remittances affect how valuable and how costly any 
specific arrangements are. The computation of costs and 
the price it is worth paying for any means is critical. 
Evidently, some overall evaluation of options is needed - 
the price worth paying in any one transaction for any one 
means depends in large measure on alternative ways of 
achieving it e.g. Mauritius has fewer options to embodying 
semi-skilled labour in import intensive exports than 
Tanzania, the Lomoros alternatives to spice and perfume 
raw material production and processing (beyond tourism) 
are none too clear whereas those of Madagascar are easier 
to discern;
In any one negotiation some means will be the critical 
targets of that negotiation; these will vary from case 
to case as well as over time and among countries - one does 
not seek foreign exchange earnings as a primary goal from 
increasing input supply for staple food production nor 
direct employment generation from a cement plant;
Indirect effects of any case (whether social structure 
impact, pollution, or more narrowly economic externalities) 
need to be estimated before negotiation by whatever method 
yields rapid and approximately correct estimates of the 
larger effects which are of concern to decision takers;
The timing of costs and gains is critical. Discounted 
cash flow is, perhaps, specific to cash (or input/output) 
flows but the underlying principles that benefits now are 
worth more than those later and deferred costs (of the 
same absolute amount) are less onerous than present is much 
more generally applicable.
Who to negotiate with depends on who can provide the "what"
A. Both in general and in any specific case one must identify 
potential negotiating partners and areas of negotiation
in terms of what is sought. E.g. market access for sisal 
twine to EEC is now controlled by a cartel. Only 
negotiations with a cartel member or a farmers' co­
operative buying large quantities of twine from them 
seems likely to be relevant to attaining the market 
access "what" for EEC, a machinery manufacturer or general 
merchant of finance house is irrelevant in this context;
B. The appropriate who will thus vary widely by country, time 
and specific project;
C. It is first critical to determine what is available 
domestically, by direct hire or purchase, through 
cooperation with other developing countries, via technical 
assistance before deciding whether to negotiate with a 
foreign firm and, if so, w hat‘to seek. When some whats can 
be met domestically (or from a genuinely cheaper external 
source) and some do need a foreign firm contract unpackaging 
must be sought (e.g. technical management but not general 
management, overseas selling but not local purchasing, hard 
technology and training in its use but not finance). Otherwise 
not only are costs raised but needless foreign inputs become 
substitutes for domestic and development is deterred;
D. In this context it is critical to realise that TNCs vary 
as to characteristics in general and specific capabilities 
in respect of individual projects. First no contract is 
cheap if the "what" sought cannot be delivered promptly and 
effectively (e.g. if the smelter only works at half 
capacity or the road is 18 months late). Second no contract 
is cheap if the what has been misidentified (e.g. a central­
ised monolithic organisation of commerce when a decentralised, 
flexible one was the actual goal). Third subject to these 
conditions a smaller, less broadbased foreign firm has 
advantages. It will probably charge less, be more concerned 
in project success (because the project is more critical to 
it) and be less able to mobilise unequally great power against 
the country during negotiation, implementation or renegotiation.
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V When to negotiate is critical in terms of short term effect and 
achieving a sequential dynamic as opposed to a dead end
A. Immediate, available problems (contradictions) characterised
by real divergences of interest (antagonistic) and
significant size are the appropriate targets for negotiation -
1. Immediate in the sense of a present or short run 
future need for specific action e.g. a fertiliser 
plant when approximate need by product is known in 
agroeconomic/agrotechnical terms not five years 
before;
2. Available - i.e. negotiations can produce results 
e.g. establishing a simple farm implements production 
and development capacity not a basic atomic chemistry 
research and development unit;
3. Problems (contradictions) in the meaning of a barrier 
to achieving means to move toward strategic goals
e.g. in Tanzania to negotiate for a Mercedes car assembly 
plant would be nugatory because Mercedes cars are not 
desired;
4. Real divergence (not purely formal) to be overcome
e.g. to negotiate on a dividend withholding tax
exemption (presumably discretionary and revocable) in 
a case in which no dividends are likely for ten years 
is somewhat pointless (to either party);
5. Significant in relation to the absolute and opportunity 
(other negotiations "given up" to pursue this one) cost 
of negotiating. E.g. to delay an integrated 20 million 
metre textile plant's coming into being two years to 
reduce a fee by $50,000 or to conduct negotiations on
a $100,000 a year output perfume plan suggests inability 
to identify and weigh up significance.
B. This pattern is important for several reasons:
1. To attempt the presently impossible may lead to absolute
losses and a lack of direction as well as failing to do 
the possible;
2. Inadequate prioretisation -is costly even if gains are 
made in what is given priority because of what is lost
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to sight (and substance) by being put aside or 
low weighted;
3. The particular path of any negotiation depends on 
(or should depend on) cross priorities beyond the 
negotiating resources. E.g. in Tanzania in 1957 
about one major nationalised sector could be directly 
organised and managed, one sub-contracted to local 
private. It was critical that banking (not, say, 
cigarettes) be chosen for direct action because of 
its central strategic role and that milling/food 
processing be the second because of basic conflicts 
of interest with available foreign managing agents.
These considerations were - in the short run - less 
critical for cement, cigarettes or beer.
C. However, when (by definition) changes over time. Thus
one goal in negotiation is to avoid creating future obstacles 
by building in options, renegotiation clauses, flexibility.
To do this effectively requires at least rough estimation 
of the range of future changes which are both reasonably 
probable and likely to be desired e.g. phasing out a managing 
agent, expanding production, changing market or supply 
channels, merging "competing" production or distribution units.
VI Where to negotiate includes picking the topics and sectors which
satisfy what and when criteria for prioretisation
A. Topical areas (either leading to independent legislative 
or administrative "negotiation") or cross-cutting several 
specific project negotiations arise in cases such as 
taxation, citizenisation, protection, infrastructure supply 
and charges;
B. Sectoral areas (which may at one extreme relate to a single 
negotiation or at the other to legislative/administrative 
general "indirect negotiations") may be defined as broadly
as export oriented manufacturing, basic domestic need oriented’ 
manufacturing, staple food production; in an intermediate 
breadth e.g. industrial power; or more narrowly e.g. the 
vector of industries from cotton growing through shirts, 
margarine, plastics and cattlefeed or cigarette production.
C. Where in this socio-economic and political economic sense
depends largely on what means have priority and when 
(whether) useful negotiation is achievable in a particular 
country at a specified time within a set of strategic goals.
VII How to negotiate comprehends strategies and tactics for deploying
and enhancing rights, powers and capacities.
A. Formal rights flow from the fact of sovereignty coupled with 
the (changing and to some extent alterable) international 
legal climate of concepts and interpretations; powers to 
exercise these rights flow from the general internal socio­
economic, socio-political and political economic stability 
unity and strength of a polity, from its external supporters 
and their effectiveness and from the number of (project) 
options it has open in pursuing its goals; capacities relate 
to ability to utilise powers in general and especially in 
respect of one project (e.g. options at micro level as to 
ways to pursue given project without the "services'! of other 
party to negotiations).
B. Rights, powers, capacities must be identified in general and 
in relation to specific negotiations if they are to be used 
(deployed) or enhanced (perhaps by the result of the 
negotiation or, alternatively, to strengthen ones position 
in it).
C. Therefore knowledge of ones own rights, powers and capacities 
and of ones own why, what, who, when, where is an essential 
first step toward preparing for negotiation. As a complement 
the same type of knowledge (even if less completely and 
precisely) should be collected in respect of the other party.
D. From this knowledge should flow;
1. The final decision on whether to negotiate, to negotiate
now (or later), with whom. (Incidentally normally the 
whom should be at least potentially plural - an option 
of that type enhances capacity e.g. two firms bidding 
for one training-plant creation-selling contract);
2. Identification of probable areas of mutual interest, of
different but not conflicting interest and of conflict;
3. The relationship of a particular negotiation to overall
negotiating strategy and to any sub-cluster of 
directly related negotiations (e.g. a textile mill 
nationalisation to other textile sector negotiations 
of recent past, present, foreseeable future).
Three "end result" patterns are worth working out in some 
detail -
1. The "optimal" result in which the gains are so 
divided it would be just worthwhile for other party 
to agree;
2. The "minimum" result beyond which no agreement (i.e. 
ending negotiations) is better for country than making 
further concessions;
3. The "cutoff" result below which the country will not 
go. This should be above the "minimum" at least
if powers and capacities are not so weak as to mean that 
virtually no options to concluding an agreement exist.
It is a mistake not to identify this result and to treat 
any contract not individually worse than none at all as 
a "satisfactory" or even as an "acceptable" result.
Evidently with three result patterns pre-consideration of 
tactics, phasing, fallback positions between "optimum" and 
"cutoff" is necessary. It is critical to keep overall 
flexibility until a final agreement is in sight and to try 
first to trade concessions critical to other party's what 
(but secondary to ones own) for gains critical to ones own 
what (but secondary to the other party's).
Tactics are largely both complex and specific. Following 
identical patterns offends both against game theory and against 
the objective differences in objective conditions surrounding 
any given set of negotiations. However a few rules of thumb 
are useful:
1. Keep control (or at least joint control) of frame as well 
as details e.g. put forward ones own draft proposals, do 
not simply chip away at the edges of the other party's;
2. Be certain one is allocating concessions for real gains 
and not squandering them on secondary matters;
3. Avoid creating constraints (e.g. a time deadline) which 
in fact bind oneself more than the other party;
*
%
*
»
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4. Maintain a coherent, united negotiating position (even 
if tactically different individuals are allotted "hard" 
and "soft" line speaking parts);
5. Correlate political, senior official, technical inputs 
into the negotiations and avoid either general 
inability to negotiate at all (i.e. totally fixed 
position) or invertebrate flexibility (no clear 
limit to concessions known to oneself) at face to 
face sessions.
H. Certain implications follow as to building and deploying
negotiating capacity:
1. Relative to possible gains and losses actual negotiations, 
preparation to negotiate and creating appropriate 
institutional knowledge and personnel infrastructure
for negotiations (in rising order) are usually given 
very.inadequate priority in attention or resource 
allocation;
2. The key inputs are: personnel (and experience acquired 
by them), knowledge (of the overall why, what, who, 
and of specific case what, who, when), institutional 
patterns (to coordinate and to involve) and a negotiating 
strategy to relate these to national decision takers 
strategic (why) and tactical (why-what) goals, 
priorities and sequences;
3. Negotiating capacity is a key area in which to build 
up basically national inputs especially in political 
decision takers attention plus legal and overall political 
economic and socic economic negotiating/brief making 
expertise. If necessary expatriates in the state's 
service or from genuinely independent third parties may be a 
workable interim device, but only as a means to building 
national capacity as well as conducting specific nego­
tiations. Only in specialised, highly technical fields 
which arise rarely should long term use of individual case 
consultants be seen as acceptable; that of a general 
international business economic negotiations management 
contract to an external body is by definition unsound.
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